The Oil Drum: Canada

In the US, as one door has closed on subprime lending, another has opened on credit card debt. Actually living within one's means doesn't always seem to be an option, for some due to poverty and for others due to greed. Either way, the debt hole Americans (and Canadians, and the British) are collectively digging themselves into is getting deeper by the day, and they start young.

As losses mount, the role of mortgage fraud, by both borrowers and lenders, and also potential securities fraud, is being revealed. The litigation is only just beginning, but be prepared for a storm of legal action and recriminations. The ratings agencies are looking vulnerable to European action as their ratings enabled the sale of bad loans to European institutions, under conditions of conflict of interest.

Signs of stress are spilling over from the world of high finance to the real economy, where trucking and shipping are feeling the slowdown. Meanwhile Canada (several months behind the US) is still seeing a booming housing market, but for how long?

With frozen ABCP (asset-backed commercial paper) apparently about to spawn a litigation nightmare in Canada, huge bank writedowns in the US and Europe, bank closures, a lack of interbank lending, large-scale ARM readjustments, exploding credit card debt, a growing surge in foreclosures, and homebuilders further depressing real estate prices by selling off their inventory for whatever they can get, one could be forgiven for wondering why global stock markets seem so unconcerned.

Some aggressive speculators - cushioned by the moral hazard of central bank liquidity injections - may be prepared to throw caution to the wind in overextending the trend, but others are waiting in the wings, well placed, through bets in the derivatives market, to profit from its eventual reversal. In a market at the peak of a mania, where rampant speculation drives volatility for short-term gain, arguably the best place to be is out of the game.

In her new book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Canadian writer Naomi Klein uses the example of public sector dismantling in both New Orleans and Iraq as an illustration of Milton Friedman's idea that crisis presents an opportunity to push a pre-existing agenda and achieve sweeping change. This is both an important point and a timely warning, as the developing international credit crunch is arguably approaching a critical phase. The inability to roll over short term commercial paper, often backed by dubious loans, is presenting an enormous challenge to a banking system short of cash. The coming economic upheaval could be sufficient to precipitate far-reaching socio-political changes on a global scale.

On the energy front, CIBC World Markets claims that Canada has 50-70% of the investable oil reserves in the world, for oil majors increasingly shut out of producing regions. However, those reserves suffer from a shortage of pipeline capacity for both inputs and output. Saskatchewan decides against 'clean coal' on cost grounds, but continues to maintain a low royalty, low tax regime for natural resources. In the meantime, the Canadian wind industry is being consolidated in fewer and fewer hands, and there is strong resistance to uranium mining in rural Ontario.

As for environmental news, Holland is developing a 200 year plan for climate change, but with the assumption that sea-levels will rise very little despite evidence of rapid change in Greenland's icesheets. There is considerable concern over the potential for warming to activate microbial oxidation of the organic matter of the arctic tundra, which could ignite a devastating spiral of positive feedback.

Naomi Klein: The Shock Doctrine

In one of his most influential essays, Friedman articulated contemporary capitalism's core tactical nostrum, what I have come to understand as "the shock doctrine". He observed that "only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces real change". When that crisis occurs, the actions taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. Some people stockpile canned goods and water in preparation for major disasters; Friedmanites stockpile free-market ideas. And once a crisis has struck, the University of Chicago professor was convinced that it was crucial to act swiftly, to impose rapid and irreversible change before the crisis-racked society slipped back into the "tyranny of the status quo". A variation on Machiavelli's advice that "injuries" should be inflicted "all at once", this is one of Friedman's most lasting legacies....

....I started researching the free market's dependence on the power of shock four years ago, during the early days of the occupation of Iraq. I reported from Baghdad on Washington's failed attempts to follow "shock and awe" with shock therapy - mass privatisation, complete free trade, a 15% flat tax, a dramatically downsized government. Afterwards I travelled to Sri Lanka, several months after the devastating 2004 tsunami, and witnessed another version of the same manoeuvre: foreign investors and international lenders had teamed up to use the atmosphere of panic to hand the entire beautiful coastline over to entrepreneurs who quickly built large resorts, blocking hundreds of thousands of fishing people from rebuilding their villages. By the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, it was clear that this was now the preferred method of advancing corporate goals: using moments of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic engineering.

(See also the Energy and Environment Round-Up for September 7th below.)

For all those who think that the world's central bankers have the developing credit crunch contained, look at the liquidity crisis in asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), which is currently affecting Canada worst of all. ABCP is an impenetrable mish-mash of mortgages, credit card receivables, car loans and other miscellaneous debt that institutions were quite happy, until recently, to use as a convenient place to park short term cash. Within a month that has seen a severe attack of risk aversion, it has gone from safe to toxic, with the result that liquidity has dried up almost completely.

In Canada, banks are trying to put together a deal that converts $35 billion of non-bank short term paper, that could no longer be rolled over, into 5-year floating-rate notes, but the credit default swaps (which can be, and were, used as vehicles for naked speculation) are a huge problem. Does the deal remind anyone of the Argentine financial crisis - where short term bonds were converted to long term (and then later defaulted upon)?

Those who think the situation contained might also look to Europe at the increasing gap between base rates and three-month interbank lending rates (Libor). That gap is now at its widest for 20 years, reflecting uncertainty and distrust as to the risk exposure of other banks, and the hoarding of cash. Interbank lending is breaking down, despite the efforts of the ECB and the Fed to restore confidence.

Is there really nothing to worry about?

ABCP investors could lose half their money

The vast majority of about $35-billion of non-bank ABCP is backed by risky bets on credit default rates that are now so far underwater that investors could be looking at losses as high as 50 on the dollar, said Edward Devlin, Canadian portfolio manager for highly respected California-based bond fund manager Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC....

....Commercial-paper markets around the globe have been struggling with fallout from the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, but the situation is worst in Canada.

"It's the one country where people couldn't get their money back," Mr. Devlin said. "There's a whole group of people who bought commercial paper [thinking it was liquid] and now they find they can't get their money back."

This is a guest Round-Up by ilargi.

Today, we change our focus (just) a little. Recently, we’ve paid much attention to finance. Still, while many see a toss-up now for which might hit us first, energy or economy, the prize may well go to the third contender: the earth.

_{AFP - Jeff Haynes}

We were thinking about this, even before the Times Comprehensive Atlas of the World published an impromptu edition. Ice caps, lakes and shorelines simply change too fast, and maps become outdated: the world no longer looks the way it did only 4 years ago. The editor-in-chief: “We can literally see environmental disasters unfolding before our eyes.”

Still, we were already noticing articles on a wide range of climate issues, from just the past 4-5 days, and without even searching for them.

Global food prices set to rise by 50% in 5 years. Australian farmers pay 50 times more for irrigation water than in 2002. California cuts off water to farmers to save fish species, French wine growers harvest grapes 8 weeks earlier than in 1978. Russia considers a wheat export ban. Holland: bread prices to rise 20% next year. Milk named the new oil. UK: many crops just drowned. [insert deep breath] Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, had another crop-killing sweltering summer. Australia relives last year’s drought (and this time may not recover). The UN predicts a global food crisis. Topsoil vanishes at record pace. 2008 declared the Year of the Frog: up to half of amphibian species could be wiped out in coming years - the biggest mass extinction since dinosaurs disappeared. North American songbirds: going going gone, and we all know where our bees are by now. Not here.

_{Satellite images of the Aral Sea 1973-2004: the vast saltwater lake has retreated as a result of river damming and been turned green by pollution.}

None of the above mentions Africa and Asia, did you notice? Once we start there, we a/ run out of space, and b/ make people think climate change is not here and not now. It is. And it’s much worse than we, facilitated by IPCC reports and Al Gore love-ins, like to think. “Will sea levels rise by 59 cm or 25 meters?" says another headline for a James Hansen article. Well, why don’t we accept the middle ground? Better safe than sorry, right? Agreed, then, 12.795 m (42 ft) it is.

In Canada, we’re headed for 2 trade-offs: the world’s most polluted mammal, the beluga, makes way for the pine beetle, while the Prairies go from grass to shrubs.

_{Images showing how Lake Chad has shrunk: Left 1972, right 1987.}

We are being lured into complacency by 'scientific' predictions and political announcements for faraway abstract dates like 2050 or 2100. But if Hansen’s only half right, it’s time to seek 'true' higher ground. Today. No amount of oil, and no amount of money, will ever bring back a million extinct species, or put the ice back on Greenland or Kilimanjaro.

Nope, That’s Not Money

Prudent Bear’s Doug Noland has for years been pointing out that one of the drivers of the credit bubble has been the ever-broadening definition of money. As the global economy expanded without a hic-up, more and more instruments came to be used as a store of value or medium of exchange or even a standard against which to value other things—in other words, as money.

Thus mortgage-backed bonds and even more exotic things came to be seen as nearly risk-free and infinitely liquid. In Noland’s terms, credit gained “moneyness,” which sent the effective global money supply through the roof. This in turn allowed the U.S. and its trading partners to keep adding jobs and appearing to grow, despite debt levels that were rising into the stratosphere. For a while there, borrowing actually made the world richer, because both the cash received and the debt created functioned as money.

With a few months of hindsight, it’s now clear that debt-as-money was not one of humanity’s better ideas. When the U.S. housing market—the source of all that mortgage-backed pseudo money—began to tank, hedge funds found out that an asset-backed bond wasn’t exactly the same thing as a stack of hundred dollar bills. The global economy then started taking inventory of what it was using as money. And it began crossing things off the list. Subprime ABS? Nope, that’s not money. BBB corporate bonds? Nope. High-grade corporates? Alas, no. Credit default swaps? Are you kidding me?

No longer able to function as money, these instruments are being “repriced” (a slick little euphemism for “dumped for whatever anyone will pay”), which is causing a cascade failure of the many business models that depend on infinite liquidity. The effective global money supply is contracting at a double-digit rate, reversing out much of the past decade’s growth.

We have been living in inflationary times, for as long as most of us can remember. The money supply keeps expanding and prices increase over time as a result. Central bankers have many tools at their disposal which they can use to tweak the economy – they can raise or lower interest rates, can control reserve requirements for fractional reserve banking and can inject liquidity into the banking system, among other things – and we have become used to thinking that they can prevent the kind of 'economic accidents' that previous episodes of excess have led to in the past. Especially in recent years – since the apparently successful containment of the dot com aftermath - we have acted as if risk were a thing of the past. Sliced, diced and spread around Wall Street and the rest of the global financial system, risk has seemed tamed, contained and controlled, until last week that is.

For years, industry insiders and so-called experts have proclaimed the virtues of slicing, dicing, and repackaging risk. They waxed on about how borrowers and savers, and society as a whole, could only benefit from such machinations. They suggested any sort of exposure could be disbursed and dissipated to the point where it essentially disappeared. Some even claimed that the crises of the past would no longer exist.

Yet amid the hype and assurances, few supporters spoke of the dark side of wanton and widespread risk-shifting. They didn’t seem — or want — to acknowledge that by combining complicated risks in unfamiliar and unnatural ways, the end result could be an uncontrollable monstrosity—one that eventually turned on its masters.
Nor did they heed the notion that by scattering risk into every nook and cranny of the global financial system, the vast web of overlapping linkages virtually guaranteed that serious problems in one sector, market, or country would trigger far-reaching shockwaves.

All of a sudden, markets are reeling around the world, deals are unraveling, the mainstream press is talking about a credit crunch and the world’s central bankers are injecting unprecedented amounts of liquidity to calm the markets. Risk has made a comeback, and in that environment the evident concern of the central bankers does not seem very reassuring.

Yesterday's financial convulsion is arguably the beginning of the end for a credit expansion of epic proportions that has underlain the economic boom of the last 25 years. It had its roots in the corruption of fractional reserve banking, as directly overseen and facilitated by the Federal Reserve. For those who look to the Fed now for a solution, perhaps it would be advisable to look instead at how the Fed created the current mess.

Fractional reserve banking was designed to provide a controlled credit expansion. However, in the early 1990s, the Fed began to find its rules too restrictve and acted to lower reserve ratios on some deposits and eliminate them for others. In addition, creative accounting implicitly condoned by the Fed allowed banks to circumvent even the limited remaining need to hold reserves. According to the Fed itself (PDF warning, see page 44), by using overnight retail sweep accounts, banks can transfer a proportion of deposits out of the category for which they must hold funds at the Fed (checking deposits), and use them to invest in interest-earning assets.

The lowering of reserve ratios and the acceptance of sweeps by the Fed over a period of many years demonstrates its attitude towards the need for reserves in the first place. How can the Fed claim to be concerned about the unsustainable expansion of the money supply (ie inflation), via the creation of essentially limitless amounts of credit, when it has been fully aware of the corruption of US fractional reserve banking all along? And how can the Fed be unaware of the eventual consequence of uncontrolled credit expansion - a debt crunch - when it has played out many times before?

Massive Surge in Sweeps

Logic? Who cares about logic? Banks are allowed to lend out checking account deposits even though they pay no interest on those accounts. Customers assume the risk and banks literally sweep up the profit. This is a sweet deal for the banks and is accomplished ironically enough via sweeps.

Sweeps are a mechanism by which "excess capital" is swept from some accounts into other buckets based on patterns of expected behavior (not all customers are going to demand all of their money all at once).

Money in the accounts where the money was swept is allowed to be lent out. In essence, the money sitting in your checking account right now is not really sitting there at all. It's lent out all over the place (in theory overnight but in practice for god knows how long or for what)....

....The study does not say it explicitly but I will. There are essentially no bank reserves. Wait a second, I take that back. The combination of fractional reserve lending and sweeps really means there are negative reserves. Far more money has been lent out than really exists.

Will the Fed cut interest rates to alleviate the developing credit crunch, and will it have the desired effect if they do? Can lowering the cost of credit overcome risk aversion and the fear of cascading default? If not then the Fed will not be able to prevent the contraction of the money supply and the spread of contagion amid a sea of margin calls.

In Canada, oil sands fever continues unabated and a drilling frenzy may be shaping up in the Arctic. One political leader urges the defence of sovereignty in the Arctic, while another holds talks on North American Union well away from the public eye. In Ontario, businesses are paid not to consume power.

On the climate front, northern infrastructure faces a serious challenge as melting permafrost undermines it's foundations, while Australia experiences a 1000 year drought.

Finally, we remember that 62 years ago, the world was waking up to the beginning of the nuclear weapons age.

Mortgage Maze May Increase Foreclosures

And the very innovation that made mortgages so easily available — an assembly line process known on Wall Street as securitization — is creating an obstacle for troubled borrowers. As they try to restructure their loans, they are often thwarted, lawyers say, by strict protections put in place for investors who bought the mortgage pools.

This impasse could exacerbate the housing slump, pushing more homeowners into foreclosure. That would lead to a bigger glut of properties for sale, depressing home prices further.

“Securitization led to this explosion of bad loans, and now it is harder to unwind and modify them even where it is in the best interests of both the borrower and the investors,” Kurt Eggert, an associate professor at the Chapman University School of Law in Orange, Calif., said in an interview. “The thing that caused the problem is making it harder to solve the problem.”

Creating difficulties is the complex design of mortgage securities.

The situation in the credit markets continues to worsen as a sudden attack of risk aversion rapidly dries up liquidity. And this is before the resetting of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) begins in earnest - to the tune of $50 billion - in October. Watch this space.

On the Canadian energy scene, Shell pumps $27 billion into the oil sands, even as oil patch profitability falls. Abu Dhabi wants to invest in Canadian power plants, and there are plans for BC to host an LNG terminal. Wind power grows rapidly in Ontario and Quebec, making a few enemies along the way. In BC they ask: should public transit be free?

On the climate front, water is the issue - too little and too much. Finally, in the tug-of-war between efficiency and resilience, efficiency has the upper hand, but what price will we pay for allowing our life support system to become brittle?

Going With The Flow?

You may remember that our definition of household cash is as broad as can be. We include all household "banking products", per se, but also include all household holdings of bonds, inclusive of Treasuries, Agencies, corporates, muni's and mortgage backed paper. Implicitly, we are assuming bond holdings could be converted to cash at a moments notice. So what follows is simply total household cash less total household liabilities over the last six decades.